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SecureAD: A Secure Video Anomaly Detection
Framework on Convolutional Neural Network in
Edge Computing Environment
Hang Cheng, Ximeng Liu, Huaxiong Wang, Yan Fang, Meiqing Wang, and Xiaopeng Zhao
Abstract—Anomaly detection offers a powerful approach to identifying unusual activities and uncommon behaviors in real-world video
scenes. At present, convolutional neural networks (CNN) have been widely used to tackle anomalous events detection, which mainly
rely on its stronger ability of feature representation than traditional hand-crafted features. However, massive video data and high cost of
CNN model training are a challenge to achieve satisfactory detection results for resource-limited users. In this paper, we propose a
secure video anomaly detection framework (SecureAD) based on CNN. Specifically, we introduce additive secret sharing to design
several calculation protocols for achieving safe CNN training and video anomaly detection. Besides, we propose a Bloom filter based
fine-grained access control policy to authenticate legitimate users, without leaking the privacy of raw personal attributes. In addition,
edge computing instead of cloud computing is integrated into the architecture to reduce response time between servers and users in
an outsourced environment. Finally, we prove that the proposed SecureAD achieves secure video anomaly detection without
compromising the privacy of the related data. Also, the simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and security of our SecureAD.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving, anomaly detection, Bloom filter, CNN, secret sharing.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, surveillance cameras are widely applied insecurity field, such as crime forensics, traffic analysis, and
infant care. With the rapid growth of surveillance cameras,
it was estimated that more than 560 petabytes per day
are generated from global surveillance cameras [1]. Due to
dual properties of both time and space from video data,
rich spatiotemporal information has attracted extensive at-
tention. As a fundamental challenge over video data, the
detection of abnormal events in video streams has aroused
great interests from both academia and industry in recent
years [2], [3]. Video anomaly detection aims to automatically
alarm to anomalous events, such as unexpected falls, illegal
entry, fighting while determining the time window of being
an anomaly in a long video sequence. To this end, most
traditional methods focus on how to design hand-crafted
feature representations for better filtering anomaly from reg-
ular events [4], [5]. However, the hand-crafted features are
generally extracted from low-level appearance and motion
cues, making them challenging to obtain superior detection
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Recently, deep learning technology with convolutional
neural networks (CNN) has enjoyed immense popularity
due to its strong capability of feature learning. At present,
deep learning technology has been introduced to tackle the
task of video anomaly detection. In particular, autoencoder
(AE) networks that have done well in object tracking and
face alignment are used to capture spatiotemporal cue of
abnormal events [2]. Besides, the long short term mem-
ory (LSTM), known as an essential tool of analyzing the
temporal events, was successfully exploited to address the
problem of the spatial motion anomaly from the temporal
view [6]. Despite their successes that are little achieved
by the hand-crafted features, the substantial computational
costs and high hardware configurations are not affordable
for resource-limited users during the complicated CNN’s
model training. Furthermore, the vast volumes of video
data also pose a significant challenge to general users. Di-
rectly employing cloud computing technique is a universal
solution to solve the above issue. However, its complexly
centralized management suffers from significant bandwidth
consumption. Alternatively, edge computing can offer the
benefit to allow the storage/computation services to be
performed at the local area network [7]. Thus, data integrity
and timely response can be ensured. Nevertheless, it will
raise concerns on data privacy due to the loss of data control
for users. The same issue exists in cloud computing. To
solve this issue, some homomorphic encryption (HE) based
attempts have been made gradually for CNN [8], [9], [10].
High computational costs and data extension, however, are
a big barrier for HE in a real-world application.
In this paper, we propose a secure, lightweight video
anomaly detection framework (SecureAD), which integrates
AE and LSTM techniques in convolution manner. With
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SecureAD, the edge servers can train the CNN model over
encrypted video streams, and provide secure anomaly de-
tection service. Specifically, we develop several additive se-
cret sharing based calculation protocols to achieve privacy-
preserving CNN training, where no raw video data and CN-
N model parameters are revealed. And also, a novel access
control mechanism is designed to realize outsourced user
authentication, where users’ attributes are kept confidential
to servers. Furthermore, edge computing is introduced into
SecureAD to reduce communication costs and response la-
tency, thus making our framework practical. To summarize,
the main contributions of SecureAD are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first at-
tempt to address the privacy-preserving CNN-based
anomaly detection task over outsourced surveillance
videos. The SecureAD allows the edge servers to
detect video anomaly, without compromising the
privacy of the video data and model parameters.
• We design a series of protocols of performing Se-
cureAD using additive secret sharing technique.
With them, the computational costs and communi-
cations overheads are much lower than HE. Besides,
no keys are involved in all types of computation
operations related to SecureAD.
• We build a Bloom filter based access control mech-
anism to allow the servers to check the validity
of the users’ identities, without leaking users’ real
attributes.
• We employ edge computing to design a novel archi-
tecture of video anomaly detection. In this architec-
ture, users and servers are combined together to car-
ry out video anomaly detection in a non-interactive
manner. Meanwhile, it can improve the response
latency, which cannot be solved by traditional cloud
computing.
In the rest of the paper, we first present some prelimi-
naries in Section 2. Then, we introduce the problem formu-
lations including system model, problem statement, security
model, and design goals in Section 3. In addition, some sub-
protocols are presented in Section 4. Furthermore, the detail
of the proposed SecureAD is shown in Section 5. Finally,
the analysis of the correctness, security, and performance
are given in Section 6. Some related work is reviewed in
Section 7. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly recall the necessary background
on CNN, Bloom filters, and additive secret sharing on which
our SecureAD is based.
2.1 Convolutional Autoencoder (CAE)
As a variation of autoencoder, CAE is generally composed
of convolution layer, pooling layer, deconvolution layer, and
unpooling layer. The former two layer types appear in the
encoding stage, and others belong to the decoding stage.
More details are given in Supplemental Materials A.1.
2.2 Convolutional Long Short Term Memory (CLSTM)
Long short term memory (LSTM) is the most commonly
used neural sequence model, which successfully prevents
backpropagated errors from gradients vanishing/exploding
by introducing the concepts of forget gate, input gate, and
output gate. Nevertheless, the architecture based on the full
connection makes LSTM hard to learn the spatial correlation
information from inputs. As a variant of LSTM, CLSTM is
firstly proposed by Shi et al. in [11] to solve the precipitation
nowcasting issue. Different from LSTM, the convolution
operations instead of matrix operations are performed to
calculate the feature maps, thus largely reducing the number
of the model training parameters. Supplemental Materials
A.2 describes some fundamental equations associated with
the forget/input/ouput gates that are indispensable parts of
CLSTM.
2.3 Bloom Filter (BF)
In general, a BF is considered as a binary vector B of m bits,
B = {b1, . . . , bm}, in which the independent hash functions
are configured to compute the element values in B. The core
idea of BF is to employ these hash functions hi(x) (i ∈ [1, k])
to map each element x of a set to an element of {1, . . . ,m},
and then set the value at the corresponding position in B
as one. Given a new element y, BF technique can determine
that it belongs to the B by the equation
∑k
i=1 bhi(y) = k.
Although BF has no false negatives, a low-probability
false positive could still happen. As described in Eq. 1,
the probability of false positives is influenced by the three
factors, namely, the hash function number k, and the BF size
m, and the original element number n. Through regulating
these factors, the probability of false positives can be con-














2.4 Additive Secret Sharing protocols
Additive secret sharing technique allows each participant to
obtain the share of the sum of some secrets by locally adding
its received shares of all secrets, namely, having additive
homomorphic property. In SecureAD, this useful property
is introduced to develop some privacy-preserving compu-
tation protocols, which serve as the basis of the privacy-
preserving CNN model training. It is worth noting that our
SecureAD is used in an environment that a pair of parties
(P1,P2) is involved in calculating a joint function of their
private inputs. To facilitate further discussion, two atomic
additive secret sharing protocols are briefly described below.
• Secure Addition Protocol (SecAdd). The goal of
this protocol is to securely compute the sum of the
private numbers u and v, namely f(u, v) = u + v.
It is straightforward for the P1 and P2 to achieve
without the interaction according to the homomor-
phic property of the additive secret sharing.
• Secure Multiplication Protocol (SecMul). The Sec-
Mul takes as input the private numbers u and v, and
outputs f1 and f2, following f = f1+f2 = u·v. Com-
pared to the SecAdd, this protocol based on Beaver’s
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triplet [12] is relatively complex, which additionally
involves the random number provider R and the
interaction between participants Pi (i ∈ {1, 2}).
More details of the above two protocols are given in
Supplemental Materials B.1 and B.2.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
To better understand, some notations related to the problem
formulation are given in TABLE 1.
TABLE 1




RP Random number provider
AU Authorized user
CNN Convolutional neural network
A∗
i,j
Adversary targeting parties i, j
3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, our framework mainly includes Content
Owner (CO), Edge Server (ES), Random Number Provider
(RP), and Authorized User (AU).
• The CO splits each video frame and access control
policy into the two random shares, and then sepa-
rately sends them to two different ESs for storage.
• The ESs take charge of the CNN model training while
providing the anomaly detection for AUs. Also, the
ESs can verify the access effectiveness of a user.
• The RP is responsible for generating some random
numbers for the secret sharing protocols.
• The AU is authorized by CO in our SecureAD. An
AU is able to decrypt and identify actual anoma-
lous events from the returned alarmed video frame
shares. Certainly, if AU has sufficient permissions, it
can also be allowed to upload its video shares to the













Fig. 1. The infrastructure of SecureAD.
3.2 Problem Statement
Consider massive surveillance videos that may include
anomalous events. Video data should be encrypted before
uploading to ESs for CNN model training or anomaly de-
tection. An AU can be allowed to identify the final anomaly
detection results or upload the encrypted videos to the ESs
for detecting anomalous events. When receiving the detec-
tion request, ESs can verify the access legitimacy of AUs.
Due to that all outsourced video data are encrypted during
the model training and anomaly detection, our proposed
framework needs to address the following issues.
• Since homomorphic encryption leads to high com-
putation costs and data extension, we need some effi-
cient, lightweight cryptographic protocols to perform
complex linear or nonlinear operations for CNN,
without compromising the users’ privacy.
• In order to free the key management in our frame-
work, a keyless cipher primitive should be designed
to encrypt the outsourced video data and all inter-
mediate results.
• To support outsourced access control, a secure, effi-
cient access authentication mechanism needs to be
built for the servers to check the validity of users’ i-
dentification, such that the servers do not learn about
user’s attribute information (e.g., name, address, and
telephone number) during the access authentication.
3.3 Security Model
The edge servers involved in our SecureAD are assumed to
follow the honest-but-curious model, which is widely used
in the signal processing in the encrypted domain [13], [14],
[15], [16]. Under this security model, ES honestly performs
the designated protocol specification, but curiosity makes
it prone to analyze the private information, such as video
contents and access policy, in its storage and convolutional
neural network parameters during CNN model training.
Besides, we assume that two edge servers do not collude
with each other. In our scheme, RP just generates a set of
random numbers. Therefore, we assume that CO directly
chooses an honest client from its company as RP.
Under the assumption of the honest-but-curious model,





{1, 2}) are considered in our attack model, which is typically
adopted in [17]. These types separately challenge CO’s
share, AU’s share, and RP’s share, which will be sent to the
j-th ES. Specifically, A∗i,j is assumed to possess the following
capabilities. First, it is able to monitor the party i (refers to
CO or AU or RP) and the ES j communications, and get
the corresponding share data. Second, it may compromise
the ES j to have access to all the encrypted data stored
at the ES j. In this case, it also obtains some encrypted
data sent from another edge server by invoking an inter-
active protocol. Third, it may perform statistical analysis of
previous anomaly detection requests, and then infer some
specific information, such as determine whether or not the
current user has logged in. Note that either the same or
different types of adversaries cannot cooperate with two ESs
simultaneously in our SecureAD.
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3.4 Design Goals
To enable privacy-preserving event anomaly detection for
outsourced surveillance videos under the above security
model, SecureAD should achieve the following goals:
• Correctness. To guarantee the excellent performance
of video anomaly detection in the encrypted domain,
our SecureAD should be designed to have the ability
of correctly training CNN model over encrypted
videos, and obtain almost the same detection per-
formance as the plaintext counterpart.
• Data Privacy. SecureAD should prevent the edge
servers from learning the video data and detected
results. Also, the privacy of the CNN model parame-
ters and users’ attributes should be protected during
the implementation of our SecureAD.
• Efficiency. To enable resource-limited users to enjoy
the quality service of anomaly detection, our Se-
cureAD should be able to provide low computa-
tion/communication costs for users.
• Outsourced Access Authentication. Generally, a trusted
access control center is dedicated to manage and
authenticate users’ attributes, which decreases the
portability of our SecureAD. For decentralization, the
outsourcing of secure access authentication should
be supported in SecurAD, in which the privacy of
users’ attributes is not leaked to ESs.
4 SECRET SHARING BASED SECURE COMPUTA-
TION PROTOCOLS
In this Section, we design a series of new powerful sub-
protocols based on SecAdd and SecMul, which can be prop-
erly combined to securely realize some complex computa-
tional functions emerged in a convolutional neural network.
To explain more clearly, we assume each edge server Pi
(i ∈ {1, 2}) holds a pair of (ui, vi) sent by CO or AUs, in
which ui and vi are additive shares of the two secrets u and
v, respectively, satisfying u = u1 + u2 and v = v1 + v2.
A common goal of the following protocols is that two Pi
corporately compute f(u, v) and separately output f1 and
f2, s.t., f = f1 + f2, where two Pi do not compromise
the individual inputs and outputs with each other. Some
important notations are listed in TABLE 2.
TABLE 2
Notation descriptions during the sub-protocol construction.
Notations Descriptions
R Random number provider
Pi (i ∈ {1, 2}) The i-th edge server
ui (i ∈ {1, 2}) The i-th share of private number u (u = u1 + u2)
vi (i ∈ {1, 2}) The i-th share of private number v (v = v1 + v2)
fi (i ∈ {1, 2}) The i-th output of protocol f (f = f1 + f2)
SecAdd/SecMul Secure addition/multiplication protocol
SecXor/SecCom Secure Xor/comparison protocol
SecMax/SecCon Secure maximum/convolutional protocol
SecRec/SecExp Secure reciprocal/natural exponential protocol
4.1 Secure XOR Protocol (SecXor)
Let u and v be two private bits. Observe that u⊕v = u+v−
2u ·v for any u, v ∈ {0, 1}. It means that XOR operation “⊕”
in Z2 is a linear combination of addition and multiplication
over a finite field F. Therefore, we can achieve secure XOR
operation between u and v by invoking SecAdd and Sec-
Mul. Specifically, two Pi with private shares ui and vi (i ∈
{1, 2}) jointly compute (g1, g2) = SecMul(u1, u2, v1, v2),
where u = u1 + u2 and v = v1 + v2. Then, Pi computes
and outputs fi = SecAdd(SecAdd(ui, vi),−2gi) without
interaction. As a result, u ⊕ v = f1 + f2 can be securely ob-
tained over F. To simplify expression, SecXor(u, v) instead
of SecXor(u1, u2, v1, v2) will be used in the subsequent
discussions. Other protocols also refer to this expression.
4.2 Secure Comparison Protocol (SecCom)
Although the literature [15] introduces a secure solution
to the comparison of two private numbers u, v ∈ R, it is
suitable only to the field of Z2 and is not compatible with
other additive secret sharing protocols in F. In this paper,
we improve it and propose a practical secure comparison
protocol SecCom over F. Specifically, we transform the com-
parison problem into the identification of the sign of u − v
(denoted as d). For a signed integer, the sign is indicated by
its most significant bit (MSB). For a non-integer x, it can be
encoded as an integer x̄ through scaling by the factor 10κ,
x̄ = x · 10κ, where κ is the length of the fractional part of
x. Thus we focus on secure MSB extraction of d · 10κ in our
SecCom as follows.
First, R generates ̺ random bits r(0), . . . , r(̺−1) and
computes r = −r(̺−1) · 2̺−1 +
∑̺−2
k=0 r
(k) · 2k based on
two’s complement encoding that represents signed numbers
in binary way. Then R splits r into two random shares a1





2 , k ∈ [0, ̺ − 1]. Then, R sends the share
ai and r
(k)
i to Pi. Note that this step can be done offline








k, i ∈ {1, 2}. Second,
each Pi computes locally its share di = ui − vi of difference
d = u − v using SecAdd, and converts di into integer
⌊di · 10
κ⌋, which is conveniently denoted by di. Following
up, Pi computes di − ai and reveals it to another ES. In this
case, Pi has a public number s = d − r and private shares
r
(k)
i (k ∈ [0, ̺ − 1]). Third, ESs collaboratively compute
the sum d of s and r just using bit-based XOR “⊕” and
AND “∧” operations, where d(k) = s(k) ⊕ r(k) ⊕ t(k) and
t(k+1) = (s(k) ∧ r(k)) ⊕ ((s(k) ⊕ r(k)) ∧ t(k)). It is obvious
that the XOR and AND operations over signed integers can
be securely achieved by invoking the SecXor and SecMul
protocols in F, whereas the comparison method in [15] is






namely, the MSB of number u− v. If d(̺−1) = 0, u ≥ v, else
otherwise. More details are described in Algorithm 1.
4.3 Secure Maximum Protocol (SecMax)
Given n private numbers {u1, . . . , un}, the purpose of Sec-
Max protocol is to ensure that each edge server can find
the maximum from these numbers. During the execution of
this protocol, n numbers including the maximum need keep
unknown to any edge server. In order to maintain privacy,
we generalize two numbers-based SecCom protocol to find
the maximum of n (n > 2) numbers. A naive approach
to find the maximum is to repeatedly compare the current
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Algorithm 1: Secure Comparison between Numbers
Input: Pi has shares ui and vi (ui, vi ∈ F, i ∈ {1, 2}).
Output: Pi outputs d
(̺−1)
i (i ∈ {1, 2}).
1 R generates ̺ random bits r(0), . . . , r(̺−1) and
computes −r(̺−1) · 2̺−1 +
∑̺−2
k=0 r
(k) · 2k → r;




2 and r → a1 + a2;
3 R sends r
(k)
i and ai to Pi, i∈ {1, 2};
4 Pi calculates ⌊(ui − vi) · 10
κ⌋ → di;
5 Pi calculates di − ai → si and sends another ES;
6 P1 and P2 set 0 → t
(0)
i , and calculate





7 for every bit position, k = 1 to ̺− 1 do
8 P1 and P2 jointly calculate:





















13 Pi returns d
(̺−1)
i .
maximum against the next adjacent number by using Sec-
Com as described before. Obviously, this approach needs to
be n − 1 rounds to achieve the maximum, namely, the time
complexity is O(n).
To improve the search speed for the maximum, SecMax
takes the paradigm of binary search trees as reference.
However, the difference is that we construct the binary tree
T from the bottom upward instead of top-down manner.
In SecMax, SecCom protocol is typically performed on a
pair of adjacent numbers at each level of T . Due to the
independence of pairs, integrating the parallel technique
into T can reduce the time complexity of searching for the
maximum from O(n) to O(log2 n). After construction, the
root node α
(h)
1 of T is taken as the maximum of n numbers.
The detailed construction of SecMax is shown in Algorithm
2 in Supplemental Materials B.3.
4.4 Secure Reciprocal Protocol/Natural Exponential
Protocol (SecRec/SecExp)
Here, our SecRec and SecExp protocols are modified ver-
sions of the SecInv and SecExp in [14], respectively. To
be specific, we use the proposed SecCom to replace the
counterparts in the SecInv and SecExp. The details of the
SecRec and SecExp protocols are shown in Supplemental
Materials B.4 and B.5.
4.5 Secure Convolutional Protocol (SecCon)
The details of SecCon are in Supplemental Materials B.6.
5 PRIVACY-PRESERVING VIDEO ANOMALY DETEC-
TION FUSING CAE AND CLSTM
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving video
anomaly detection framework, as shown in Fig. 2. In this
framework, both CAE and CLSTM are assembled in a
unified convolutional network, in which this combination is
often adopted to capture the sufficient spatiotemporal infor-
mation in computer vision issues [6]. For ease of expression,
hereafter, the superscript signs “ ˜ ” and “ ̂ ” are used to
denote the shares, which are distributed to two edge servers.
Policy
Train
   CNN
Request
Train
   CNN
CO
Send
        Random





























Fig. 2. Framework of SecureAD scheme.
5.1 Secure Outsourced Access Control Mechanism
To realize fine-grained access control, the attribute-based
public-key cryptosystem with ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE)
introduced by Bethencourt [18] may be an appropriate
approach to determine which users can enjoy the anomaly
detection service. However, the key escrow will raise the
privacy concerns on users’ private keys. Therefore, we pro-
pose a Bloom filter based keyless outsourced access control
mechanism, which allows ESs to perform user authenti-
cation while keeping the access control policy and users’
attributes confidential to the ESs.
Assume that our SecureAD contains n attributes
{A1, A2, . . . , An}. Let Vi = {vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,ni} be a set of
possible values of Ai (i ∈ [1, n]). After a new CO registers
the system, the CO first needs to define an access policy
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} (Pi ⊂ Vi) that only allows the users
with the matching attributes to perform video anomaly
detection on its pre-trained CNN model. Following, the CO
employs the Bloom filter technique to generate a Bloom
filter Bi = {bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,mi} associated with the access
policy Pi = {pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,ℓi} (i ∈ [1, n]), where a set
of the hash function Hi = {hi,1, hi,2, . . . , hi,ki} is used
to compute Pi. More specifically, for each element pi,s of
Pi, CO calculates hi,t(pi,s) and sets bhi,t(pi,s) as 1, where
s ∈ [1, ℓi] and t ∈ [1, ki]. Thus, CO can obtain a set of Bloom
filters {Bi} (i ∈ [1, n]) corresponding to its defined access
policy P . Next, CO splits each Bloom filter Bi (i ∈ [1, n])
into the two random shares, and then sends them to the
corresponding edge server.
Let user’s attribute value list be Vuser =
{v1,l1 , v2,l2 , . . . , vn,ln}, where vi,li ∈ Vi. Similarly, Vuser is
transformed into n Bloom filters Qi = {qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,mi}
(i ∈ [1, n]), each of which has the same bit-length as B̃i.
And also, Qi is divided randomly into two shares, and sent
to edge servers P1 and P2, respectively. When obtaining the
user authentication request, two ESs corporately calculate
bi,j ∧ qi,j for any i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1,mi] by directly
invoking SecMul, namely, (si,j , ti,j) = SecMul(bi,j , qi,j),





j=1 ti,j , and sends
them to each other. This step implies that each Pi can know
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j=1 ti,j , which is equal to the sum of
element-wise AND of Bi and Qi (i ∈ [1, n]). According to
the knowledge in Subsection 2.3, if all ai(i ∈ [1, n]) are
equal to k, each ES can identify that the attribute value list
of the current user matches with CO’s defined access policy
P . Otherwise, the user is determined to be illegal.
Remark: There are few possible values for some specific
attributes in real applications, such as gender. In this case,
merging these attributes into one attribute is a wise solution
to reduce computation complexity.
5.2 Secure CNN fusing CAE and CLSTM
In the following, we will use those above elementary secure
protocols to construct some sophisticated security protocols
to achieve secure CAE and CLSTM.
5.2.1 Secure CAE
As described in Subsection 2.1, CAE generally includes the
convolution/deconvolution layer and pooling/unpooling
layer. Here, we will give the detail of these layers during
privacy-preserving forward/backward propagation.
A. Secure Forward Propagation
Convolution Layer. Based on Eq.15 in Supplemental
Materials A.1, the value of each neuron in any convolution
layer can be calculated by adopting the convolution and
activation operations. As for the convolution operation, it
can be securely done through performing the proposed Sec-
Con protocol. Thus, how to securely carry out the activation
operation become desired. In CAE of our framework, we
take the sigmoid function σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x) as activation
operation. It is very apparent that the sigmoid function con-
sists of three basic operations, natural exponential, addition,
and reciprocal. Therefore, we can combine SecExp, SecAdd,
and SecRec protocols to achieve the secure computation of
the sigmoid function by the following two steps.
Step-1: The server Pi runs the SecExp protocol to output
fi, s.t., f1 + f2 = e
−x.
Step-2: The server P1 calculates g1 = 1 + f1 and P2 sets
g2 = f2, where g = g1 + g2 = 1 + e
−x. Thus, servers P1
and P2 jointly calculate (h1, h2) =SecRec(g) by using the
SecRec protocol.
As a result, the sigmoid function with the input x,
σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x) can be securely obtained by directly
calculating the summation of h1 and h2. To simplify the
representation, we denote the secure computation protocol
of σ(x) as SecSig. With the SecSig protocol, the edge servers
P1 and P2 jointly calculate the value of each neuron in the
convolution layer, without learning about any useful infor-
mation. More specifically, once obtaining secure version of



















i,j , and the secure versions of “*”
and “+” operations can be achieved by invoking the SecCon
and SecAdd protocols.
Pooling Layer. Using the SecAdd protocol, we readily
calculate the average-pooling in the encrypted domain. Let
the value of neuron at position (i, j) in the mth channel
in the lth layer as λ
(m,l)

















where the size of pooling filter is set to n×n. Based on Eq. 3,
Pi(i ∈ {1, 2}) individually computes the desired share of
λ
(m,l)
i,j by repeatedly calling the protocol SecAdd.
Deconvolution Layer. Deconvolution layer is a reverse
operation of the convolution layer. Essentially, it works the
same way as the convolution layer. Therefore, the above
convolution layer can be taken as a reference to obtain a
secure version of the deconvolution layer.
Unpooling Layer. The unpooling layer carries out the up-
sampling operation, which reverses the pooling operation.
In this layer, the edge servers P1 and P2 only need to set the
value of neuron at position (i+ s, j + t) in the mth channel










where let the lth layer be unpooling layer. And s, t ∈ [1, n].
B. Secure Backward Propagation
Backward propagation usually adopts a gradient descent
method to update the weights, where the different neurons
are set to different weights according to those neuron errors
that are propagated from the total loss. In the following, our
focus is to achieve secure weight updating process.
Assume that the δ
(l)
i is the error matrix of the i
th feature
map in the lth layer. If the lth layer is the pooling layer and
the next layer is the convolution layer, δ
(l)
i is securely calcu-



















i,j denotes the weight matrix of the i
th feature
map in the jth kernel connected to the (l + 1)th layer. M is
the kernel number in the (l + 1)th layer. If the lth layer is
the convolution layer and the (l + 1)th layer is the pooling
layer, we just perform the upsampling operation on δ
(l+1)
j .
Based on the error matrix δ
(l)
i , we can deduce the fol-
lowing updating equations of weight matrixes by using
proposed secure protocols.
(W̃new , Ŵnew) = SecAdd (Wold,−η · ∇W ) ,





where “∇” denotes gradient, and η indicates the learning
rate that is public to all participants. A
(l−1)
i is the i
th feature
map in the (l − 1)th layer.
Meanwhile, we can derive the updating equations of
biases by






where (u, v) denotes the neuron coordinate of the j feature
map in the lth layer.
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5.2.2 Secure CLSTM
As introduced in Subsection 2.2, CLSTM is mainly com-
posed of forget gate, input gate, and output gate. The
functions of these gates can be achieved by using equations
17 through 22 in Supplemental Materials A.2. Except for
19 and 22, all equations can be modified into secure ones
based on the proposed secure protocols. As for Eq.19 and
22, it seems obvious that the key issue is to realize the
secure computation of the function tanh(x). Fortunately, the
tanh(x) can be represented as the function of the sigmoid







− 1 = 2σ(2x)− 1. (4)
By using the SecSig protocol, the secure version of tanh(x)
can be achieved, and denoted as SecTan(x).
A. Secure Forward Propagation
The computation tasks in the input gate contain all
operations that appeared in both the forget gate and output
gate. For the sake of simplicity, we only take the input gate
as an example to illustrate how to employ the additive secret
sharing technique to calculate the related tasks securely.
First, P1 and P2 cooperatively to decide which is input data.
Concretely, given time t, P1 and P2 separately calculate
(̃it, ît) = SecSig (Wi ∗ [ht−1, xt, Ct−1] + bi) ,
In the next step, a new candidate C′t is created to decide
which information in the input data will be added to the




t) = SecTan (WC ∗ [ht−1, xt] + bc) .
Based on the above steps, P1 and P2 jointly create a
secure update for the current state Ct, namely,
(C̃t, Ĉt) = SecAdd(ft ◦ Ct−1, it ◦ C
′
t).
The Hadamard product “◦” is typically performed by the
pairwise multiplication of two input matrices. Therefore, Pi
can correctly carry out the “◦” operation over the ciphertext
data by calling SecMul protocol. Hereafter, we denote the
secure protocol of the “◦” operation as SecHad.
Similarly, the edge servers also finish all computation
tasks related to the forget/output gate, without knowing
about the plaintext data.
B. Secure Backward Propagation
In CLSTM, the total loss E at time t can be represented as
the function of the hidden cell ht. Therefore the error δht for
ht is available, where δht is equal to the partial derivative of














Based on Eq.22 in Supplemental Materials A.2, we rewrite
the above equation as:
δot = δht ◦ tanh(Ct), (5)
Following the same process for ft, it, and C
′
t, we can get
δft = δht ◦ (1− tanh
2(Ct)) ◦ ot ◦ Ct−1, (6)
δit = δht ◦ (1− tanh
2(Ct)) ◦ ot ◦ C
′
t, (7)
δC′t = δht ◦ (1− tanh
2(Ct)) ◦ ot ◦ it, (8)
δht−1 = δft ∗Whf + δit ∗Whi + δC′t ∗Whc + δot ∗Who,
(9)
where ot, ft, it, C
′
t can be obtained from the forward propa-
gation process.
Using the SecHad, SecAdd, SecMul, SecCon protocols,
we can allow ESs to calculate these equations 5 through 9
on the obfuscated shares. As a result, ESs can calculate the
partial derivative of the total loss with respect to all weights



















where T denotes the time step. ϕ(x) represents the deriva-
tive of the function tanh(x), viz., ϕ(x) = tanh′(x) =
(1 − tanh2(x)). The overbar represents the input of tanh
in the corresponding equation. Similarly, Pi can securely
calculate ∇Whµ,∇WCµ,∇Wxµ,∇bµ, where µ belongs to
the set of {f, i, o}. Following, the weights and biases can
be securely updated by using the same update equations as
ACE part.
5.3 Secure Anomaly Evaluation
In the plaintext domain, when the model is trained, the
regularity score s used to evaluate abnormality of video





e(x) = ‖x− fW (x)‖2, (11)
where fW (·) denotes the reconstruction operation using the
trained model weights W . e(x) represents the reconstruc-
tion error between the original frame x and the reconstruct-
ed frame fW (x). ‖ · ‖2 indicates the Euclidean distance.
Based on the above equations, the larger e(x) is, the
lower the regularity score s(x) is, which means that video
frame x has a higher probability of being anomalous. On the
contrary, the frame with higher regularity score is always
determined to be normal. As Eq. 10 and 11 only involve the
simple elementary operations, they are easily modified as
the following secure versions using the proposed additive
secret sharing based interactive protocols.
(s̃(x), ŝ(x)) = SecAdd(1,−SecMul(SecAdd(e(x),
− SecMin(e(x))),SecRec(SecMax(e(x)))),
(ẽ(x), ê(x)) = SecSqr(SecMul(SecAdd(x,−fW (x)),
SecAdd(x,−fW (x))))
where SecMin denotes minimum secure protocol, which
can be obtained just by choosing the reverse result in
SecMax protocol. The SecSqr is a secure protocol of being
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used to calculate the square root of a positive number.
Similar to the SecRec protocol, the SecSqr protocol is






) is instead of Eq.23 (in Supplemental
Materials B.4) in SecRec protocol.
5.4 Functional extension for our SecureAD
We list three functional extensions for SecureAD as follows.
Extension for multiple COs: In the previous section,
SecureAD is mainly designed for the setting: a CO with
multiple AUs. In fact, our SecureAD is also suitable for
multiple COs, which attributes to the key-free characteristic
of the additive secret sharing technique that is used for the
construction of all non-interactive/interactive protocols in
SecureAD. In addition, the proposed access control mecha-
nism supports multiple COs scenarios.
Extension for multiple ESs: As described in Section 4,
all secure protocols are based on the protocols SecAdd and
SecMul. It indicates that these two protocols determine the
scalability of our SecureAD to n(n ≥ 3) ESs. Since SecAdd
is performed locally, it can be easily extended to the n
ESs setting. As for SecMul, we can directly employ the
multiparty technique in [12] to improve it so that SecureAD
meets the needs of multiple ESs.
Extension for other applications: As the proposed pro-
tocols can achieve secure CNN model training, SecureAD
with appropriate modifications can be applied to other
CNN-based secure computer tasks, such as image classifi-
cation, instance segmentation, object localization, etc.
6 ANALYSIS OF OUR SECUREAD
In this section, we first illustrate the correctness analysis of
SecureAD, and then give its security and performance.
6.1 Correctness Analysis
In SecureAD, all involved linear and nonlinear are calcu-
lated by using the additive secret sharing technique. To be
special, we design some secure protocols with the additive
property, and then elaborately combine them to achieve all
computation tasks in SecureAD. Therefore, the correctness
of SecureAD completely depends on whether these proto-
cols introduce errors or not.
Theorem 1. The difference of the video anomaly detection results
between SecureAD and its plaintext version is negligible.
Proof: Considering whether the error exists, the secu-
rity protocols in SecureAD can be divided into two types.
The first type has the error-free characteristic. This type of
protocol includes the SecAdd, SecMul, SecXor, SecCom,
SecMax, SecCon, and SecHad protocols. Among them,
the former two protocols are correct, which are concluded
in [13]. As described in Section 5, the latter five protocols are
a linear combination of the SecAdd and SecMul protocols
in an error-free manner. Therefore, the last five protocols are
also correct. The second type consists of four sub-protocols,
SecExp, SecRec, SecSig, and SecTan. Different from the
first type, this type of protocol will introduce approxima-
tion errors, which mainly are caused by the following two
factors. One is to use n-th order Maclaurin expansion to
approximate the natural exponential function eu. According
to Taylor’s expansion theorem, the error produced by this
approximation method can be denoted as the remainder in











where ξ ∈ (0, u). The above equation indicates that the
Rn(u) → 0 when n → ∞ and u ∈ (0, 1). It means that
the approximation error can be controlled at an arbitrary
low level as long as n is big enough. In fact, we only need
set n to 13 such that the high order of accuracy for eu with
a negligible error not less than 10−10 can be achieved.
Another is to employ the Newton-Raphson iterative
method to approximate 1/u. Let the (n + 1)-th and n-th
iterative errors be εn+1 = 1/u − xn+1 and εn = 1/u − xn,





where ξn is in between xn and 1/u. The symbol “||” takes
absolute value and f(x) = 1/x − u. Eq. 13 implies that
the Newton-Raphson method can achieve quadratic conver-
gence. If only the initial estimate x0 is in between 0 and 2/u,
lim
n→∞
xn = 1/u holds.
As described in Section 5, our SecureAD is construct-
ed based on the various linear combination of the above
two types of protocol. Consequently, the accuracy of our
SecureAD can infinitely close to that of its corresponding
plaintext framework only if we guarantee the errors of the
second type of protocol are at a negligible level.
Theorem 2. The proposed user access authentication is correct
under the honest-but-curious model, provided that a user is
authorized.
Proof: In SecureAD, we employ the BF technique to
build an access authentication mechanism. Due to the BF
having no false negatives, each attribute of an authorized
user can be ensured to correctly match with the access
policies made by the corresponding COs. Besides, ESs fol-
low the pre-set protocols to carry out their computation
tasks under the honest-but-curious model. It means that they
cannot tamper the intermediate or final results such that the
access authentication can be correctly calculated. Therefore,
our SecureAD can assure that the access authentication is
successfully performed when a user is authorized.
Remark: Although the Theorem 2 can guarantee that au-
thorized users are successfully authenticated, there are false
positives during the BF usage. It indicates that an unau-
thorized user may be verified through. This issue can be
solved by performing the following steps. In the first step,
we can select proper parameters to reduce the false positive
probability largely. It is shown in [19] that the false positive
probability can be minimized as 2−k ≈ 0.618m/n on the
condition of k = ln2 · (m/n), where all meanings of the
tunable parameters k, m, n refer to Subsection 2.3. In the
second step, the false positive probability can be further
reduced by allotting multiple BFs to each attribute. Let ω
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be the number of BF for a given attribute. The false positive










Clearly, the false positives are statistically insignificant when
ω is large enough, which is verified in the latter experiments.
6.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we prove the security of sub-protocols
and then give the security analysis of our SecureAD. To bet-
ter analyze the security of sub-protocols, we first formally
present the secure definition and related elementary lemmas
of a share-based computation protocol [13], [14], [15].
Definition 1. We say that a protocol π is secure if there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S that can generate
a view for the adversary A in the real world and the view is
computationally indistinguishable from its real view.
Lemma 1. A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its sub-
protocols are perfectly simulatable [20].
Lemma 2. If a random element r is uniformly distributed on Zn
and independent from any variable x ∈ Zn, then r ± x is also
uniformly random and independent from x [21].
Theorem 3. The SecCom protocol in Subsection 4.2 is secure to
compare which one on two private numbers is larger under the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof: In the SecCom protocol, the ES P1 has the
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1 follow the uniform
random distribution according to the Lemma 2, where
t
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1 . As a result, V iew1
and Output1 are computationally indistinguishable for the
adversary A. The same case for P2.
Theorem 4. The SecMax protocol proposed in Subsection 4.3
is secure to find the maximum of a series of numbers under the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof: As described in Subsection 4.3, the SecMax
protocol takes the SecCom protocol as sub-protocol. And
also, all input numbers are uniformly random at each edge
server. Therefore, it can be concluded that the SecMax
protocol is secure under the honest-but-curious model based
on Theorem 3 and Lemma 1.
Theorem 5. The protocols SecRec, SecExp, SecSig, and SecTan
are secure under the honest-but-curious model.
Proof: Please refer Supplemental Materials C for a
security proof.
Theorem 6. The protocols SecXor, SecCon, and SecHad are
secure under the honest-but-curious model.
Proof: Please refer Supplemental Materials C for a
security proof.
Theorem 7. Our SecureAD framework is secure under the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof: Essentially, our SecureAD is composed of all
sub-protocols as previously mentioned, which are described
detailedly in Subsection 5.2. It indicates that SecureAD can
be viewed as a big protocol, which is a combination of
the previous sub-protocols. In terms of Lemma 1, we can
guarantee the security of our SecureAD because that all
related sub-protocols have been proved to be secure under
the honest-but-curious model.
Theorem 8. Our SecureAD framework is secure against the
adversaries A∗i,j(i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2}) defined in Subsec-
tion 3.3.
Proof: In our security model, the adversary A∗i,j is
assumed to have an ability to eavesdrop the communication
link between the party i and the edge server j. It means that
A∗i,j can get all transmitted data from the link. Besides, all
data stored in the ES j may also be available to A∗i,j when
the ES j is compromised by A∗i,j . In SecureAD, these data are
meaningless shares split by using the additive secret sharing
technique. Since A∗i,j does not obtain all two shares from
the same data, A∗i,j cannot reconstruct the corresponding
plaintext data. Due to compromising with the ES j, A∗i,j
may also obtain the intermediate ciphertext data transmitted
by another ES during CNN model training and anomaly
detection process. Based on the knowledge in Section 5,
it is obvious that these intermediate data are generated
mainly by executing the SecCom or SecMax or SecRec
or SecExp. According to Theorem 3 through Theorem 5,
these intermediate data are uniformly random, which can-
not be decrypted by A∗i,j . Besides, additive secret sharing
technique allows different user attribute shares/video frame
shares to correspond to the same user/frame. So, the non-
deterministic characteristic can guarantee request unlinka-
bility, which disables statistical attacks.
Based on the above analysis, our SecureAD is secure
against the adversaries defined in the security model.
6.3 Performance Analysis
We evaluate SecureAD on benchmarking dataset: Av-
enue [22], which is one of the most commonly used databas-
es for video anomaly detection. The dataset comprises of 37
video clips, where 16 video clips are for the training and
others are used for the testing. The evaluations are carried
out on three Lenovo laptops, each of which is equipped with
an I5-7200 2.5GHz processor and 8GB Memory running
windows 7-64bit. Specifically, a laptop is used to simulate
CO or RP, and another two laptops for edge servers. In
the following experiments, the number of iteration and the
remainder are set to 30 and 10−10, respectively. These two
parameters are discussed in Supplemental Materials D.
6.3.1 Performance evaluation of encryption
It is well known that Paillier cryptosystem[23] is a public-
key cryptsystem due to its probabilistic encryption and
additively homomorphic property. At present, it is widely
used to achieve the privacy-preserving machine learning.
Therefore, we made a performance comparison between our
scheme with Paillier cryptosystem, in which the public key
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(PK) is set to N = 2048-bit in consideration of the security
strength of Paillier crptosystem. The implementation results
listed in TABLE 3 show that the number of Paillier ciphertext
(Ctxt) bits is 4096, but only 2049 bits in our scheme for a
same 2048-bit message m. The main reason is that Paillier
Ctxt is generated under modulus N2, and our Ctxt is com-
posed of m’s two random secret shares, each of which has
the same bit length with m. It is not surprising to find from
TABLE 3 that PK is 0 in our scheme, because the proposed
encryption is keyless. The same reason is for the key gen-
eration (KeyGen). As shown in TABLE 3, the computation
costs of the addition (Add) and scalar multiplication (SMul)
operations in our scheme are substantially below those of
Paillier encryption, reducing two orders of magnitude.
TABLE 3
Implementation results.
Schemes Ctxt PK KeyGen Add SMul
Paillier 4096-bit 2048-bit 670.80ms 62.40µs 42.12µs
Ours 2049-bit 0 0 0.20µs 0.23µs
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Fig. 3. Performance analysis in different algorithms: (a) Computation
costs in the encryption process; (b) Computation costs in the decryption
process.
To further demonstrate the superiority, the comparison
of the computation costs for the encryption and decryption
is also conducted. As we can see from Fig. 3, the running
time of both encryption and decryption in Paillier cryp-
tosystem rapidly goes up with the increase of the number
of the corresponding messages. This is mainly because that
it has higher computation costs and ciphertext expansion
rate than that of our scheme. Moreover, Fig. 3 illustrates
that when adding the number of messages, the computation
costs of these two processes in our scheme are almost the
same and are close to 0. Specifically, when the number of
the plaintext/ciphertext messages is 107, the entire costs of
the encryption/decryption process 218.4/31.2 milliseconds
only. It means that our scheme is more efficient.
Furthermore, there are strong correlations between adja-
cent pixels in different directions, which contain horizon-
tal, vertical, diagonal directions. In general, the effective
reduction of these correlations is a critical indicator for
a good encryption algorithm. Therefore, we introduce the
correlation coefficient to evaluate these three correlations in





where cov(·, ·) and D(·) denote covariance and variance
functions, respectively. If r is close to 0, the weak correlation
will be obtained. If r is close to 1, the strong correlation
appears. The comparison with the plaintext ones is listed
in TABLE 4, where the five classic gray images (Man, Lena,
Boat, Bridge, Baboon) sized of 512×512 are used to evaluate.
Note that an image by our scheme is encrypted into the two
shares with the same size as that of the original image. It is
easy to find that our scheme can effectively eliminate these
three correlations.
6.3.2 Performance of our SecureAD
We first analyze the effect of the convolutional operation
on the efficiency of CNN, which is typically performed on
convolutional operation. Take CAE∗ (described in Supple-
mental Materials D) as an example, we illustrate that three
factors related to the convolutional operation: the number
of kernel, the size of kernel, and the size of frame image, are
how to affect the CNN’s training time.
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Fig. 4. Performance analysis on convolutional operation for the for-
ward propagation (FP) and backward propagation (BP). (a) Effect of
n on training time (m = 26, k = 3); (b) Effect of k on training time
(m = 26, n = 2); (c) Effect of m on training time (k = 3, n = 2).
It is clear from Fig. 4 that either FP or BP takes more
computational time as n or k or m increases. Given a video,
the size of frame image is always fixed as a constant. In
this case, n and k will affect the computational costs of the
convolutional operation, which indirectly has an impact on
the efficiency of secure CNN training or testing. Compared
with the size of kernel, n has a bigger impact on the CNN’s
performance. This is because that n is generally far larger
than k in the realistic scenes.
In SecureAD, we adopt the construction of CNN in [6]
to set up the privacy-preserving video anomaly detection
system. TABLE 5 presents the architecture of our CNN
and gives some necessary configuration information: the
number of the kernel, kernel size, stride. The last column
shows the number of the weight parameters in each layer,
which can be calculated from the configuration information
of the corresponding layer. As stated in Section 2, our CNN
includes the two parts: CAE and CLSTM. The former is used
to capture the spatial information of anomalous events in
video streams. And it consists of an encoder and a decoder,
which are separately represented by the first two layers
and the last two layers in TABLE 5. The latter is capable
of tracing the temporal information of anomalous behav-
iors. There are three different configuration parameters for
CLSTM in SecureAD. For the sake of distinction and follow-
up discussion, we denote them as CLSTM-I, CLSTM-II, and
CLSTM-III, which correspond to the third, fourth, and fifth
layers in TABLE 5, respectively. It was well known that a
CNN model can be usually achieved through several rounds
of FP and BP, which is commonly called the model training.
After the CNN model training, only forward propagation is
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TABLE 4
The correlation coefficients of original image and encrypted versions.
Image
Original image Share for P1 Share for P2
Horizontal Vertical Diagonal Horizontal Vertical Diagonal Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Man 0.9673 0.9600 0.9384 −0.0144 −0.0011 0.0273 −0.0013 −0.0018 −0.0165
Lena 0.9847 0.9769 0.9617 −0.0183 −0.0223 0.0039 −0.0415 −0.0144 0.0120
Boat 0.9715 0.9392 0.9145 0.0178 −0.0510 −0.0029 −0.0196 −0.0066 −0.0185
Bridge 0.9252 0.9422 0.9075 −0.0114 0.0104 −0.0027 −0.0389 −0.0099 −0.0034
Baboon 0.7764 0.8672 0.7531 0.0056 −0.0017 −0.0037 −0.0123 −0.0163 0.0043
used to test the performance of anomaly detection. There-
fore, we focus on the performance analysis of FP and BP in
the following experiments.
TABLE 5
Our convolutional neural network architecture.
Layer (type) # of kernel Kernel size Stride # of parameter
Convolution 128 11× 11 4 15616
Convolution 64 5× 5 2 204864
CLSTM 64 3× 3 1 295168
CLSTM 32 3× 3 1 110720
CLSTM 64 3× 3 1 221440
Deconvolution 128 5× 5 2 204928
Deconvolution 1 11× 11 4 15489
Stride: The step size of the kernel movement; “#”: The number.
Efficiency evaluation: In TABLE 6, we first compare the per-
formance of two stages (encoding and decoding) composed
of CAE, where the batch size is 10, and the bit-length ℓ of
data is 32. It is evident that the computational complexity
of BP is higher than that of FP, no matter which stage. We
attribute it to the fact that more convolutional operations are
carried out in BP. Since convolution is a local and dominant
operation in CNN, the number of convolution operations
could account for the computational costs in CNN. Also,
we observe that more time is consumed in the decoding
stage than the encoding stage during FP or BP process. This
is because massive padding operations significantly enlarge
the size of input data, resulting in the increasing amount
of convolution operations, and then raising computational
overheads.
TABLE 6
Comparison of the runtime and message size on different stages in
CAE part of our CNN.
Stages









Encoding 184.464 4.995 967.846 0.678
Decoding 649.635 0.339 1241.047 5.334
In SecMul protocol, the additive shares of three random
numbers need to be transmitted from RP to each ES, in
which the network bandwidth is required to transit. As a
convolutional operation involves several multiplications, its
secure version SecCon protocol is performed by using more
bandwidths. Assume that the size of a kernel is k × k. In
theory, RP needs to send messages with a total length of
3k2ℓ bits to each ES just for secure convolution operation
at a time. Based on this conclusion, around 4289.632 MB
bandwidths are consumed in the first layer of our CNN.
Obviously, the whole CNN incurs more communication
overheads, generally with GB-scale.
Let the size of the feature maps in the (l − 1)th layer
be h × h. To reduce the communication costs, we only
provide three random maps of size h × h to assist ES to
securely carry out the multiplication operations in the lth
layer, where the relationship of the three numbers at the
same position of three random maps equals that of a, b, c in
SecMul. Thus, the strategy can offer three random numbers
for each position in feature maps. Note that, given a layer
in CAE, three random numbers are shared by different
feature maps, and are regenerated to each batch sample
for better safety. As listed in TABLE 6, the strategy of
random maps greatly decreases communication overloads.
For the same first layer, RP equipped with random maps
only sends around 4.72 MB to each ES, which is far lower
than the original 4289.632 MB. Meanwhile, we observe that
the communication costs of the encoding stage are much
more than the decoding stage in FP. It can be explained that
the size of the feature map at the encoding stage is relatively
bigger than that at the decoding stage. The same reason can
be used to explain the case existed in BP.
TABLE 7
Comparison of the runtime and message size on different gates in
CLSTM-I with 64 kernels and 64 channels.
Gates









Forget Gate 88.707 0.186 71.734 0.371
Input Gate 148.231 0.309 129.301 0.681
Output Gate 89.988 0.433 72.862 0.495
Furthermore, we evaluate the efficiency of CLSTM part
in SecureAD. TABLE 7 illustrates a comparison of the run-
time and message size on different gates in CLSTM-I, in
which the time step is equal to 10. Compared to the above
CAE part, FP in CLSTM-I occupies more computational
time than BP. It can be deduced from the computational
equations involved in the three gates that the scale of the
convolutional operations in FP is larger than that in BP. The
other reason is that the same part δht ◦ (1− tanh
2(Ct)) ◦ ot
in equations 6 through 8 only needs to be calculated once in
BP. TABLE 7 also shows the compared results of the com-
munication costs over different gates and stages. Since the
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size of the feature maps in CLSTM-I is relatively small, we
here assign a set of three random maps for each convolution
or Hadamard product appeared in the relevant equations to
ensure that the intermediate results in each ES are random
enough. In terms of computation costs and communication
overloads, we can observe from TABLE 8 and 9 that the
correlative relationship between the different gates or stages
in CLSTM-II/CLSTM-III is consistent with that in CLSTM-I.
TABLE 8
Comparison of the runtime and message size on different gates in
CLSTM-II with 32 kernels and 64 channels.
Gates









Forget Gate 26.807 0.186 17.731 0.371
Input Gate 45.116 0.309 33.063 0.681
Output Gate 27.654 0.433 18.206 0.495
TABLE 9
Comparison of the runtime and message size on different gates in
CLSTM-III with 64 kernels and 32 channels.
Gates









Forget Gate 53.872 0.186 49.584 0.371
Input Gate 88.554 0.309 86.969 0.681
Output Gate 55.106 0.433 49.604 0.495
TABLE 10
Ratio of different operations in our CNN.
Operation type CAE part CLSMT-I CLSMT-II CLSMT-III
Convolution 98.39% 97.92% 97.41% 97.43%
Activator 1.55% 1.71% 2.11% 2.13%
Others 0.06% 0.37% 0.48% 0.44%
The results presented in the above four tables indicate
that a major concern for our SecureAD is the high cost of
time. To address this issue. We made statistics on compu-
tational costs of some operations in SecureAD. TABLE 10
shows that secure convolutional operation in any part of our
whole CNN has the largest proportion for time consump-
tion, and then activator operations (contains SecSig and
SecTan), and other operations (contains SecAdd, SecHad
and so on) least. Fortunately, the convolutional operations
in the same layer are completely independent of each other,
which means that we can use the existing mature parallel
techniques to reduce the time consumption drastically.
Fig. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the effect of the length of
Bloom filter α and the number of hash functions β with
different ω on attribute false positive probability (FPP).
We observe that the lower attribute FPP will be achieved
when using the larger α or β under the same conditions.
Additionally, as the number of Bloom filter ω increases, the
lower FPP can be obtained, theoretically, would tend to zero,
which is verified by Eq. 14. For example, when α = 1000,
β = 10, and the number of users’ attribute value γ = 50,
FPP with ω = 5 is only 5.7 × 10−21, which is far lower
than 8.9 × 10−5 with ω = 1. However, it will increase the
communication costs between RP and ES. There needs to be
a trade-off between communication costs and FPP. In fact, γ
is also a factor to affect FPP. Different from factors α, β, it is
of proportional relation with FPP.
In SecureAD, user access control only involves addition
and multiplication operations, so the runtime to authenti-
cate a user is relatively slow. Specifically, when α = 1000,
β = 10, γ = 50 and ω = 5, each edge server will only con-
sume on average around 46 ms to perform its computation
task for a user with 50 attributes. In real scenarios, however,
the number of user attribute is no more than 20 [24].
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Fig. 5. Effect of α and β on attribute FPP. ω denotes the number of Bloom
filters. (a) The attribute FPP as a function of α (β = 7, and γ = 50); (b)
The attribute FPP as a function of β (α = 1000, and γ = 50).




































Fig. 6. Effect of our SecureAD on the accuracy of video anomaly detec-
tion. (a) The computation error as a function of iteration numbers; (b)
The computation error as a function of batch size.
Accuracy evaluation: In SecureAD, the approximate pro-
cesses of the SecExp and SecRec protocols may affect the
accuracy of the detection system. Considering this, we also
evaluate the computation error introduced by SecureAD at
FP and BP stages. As shown in Fig. 6(a), we find that the
computation error can still be controlled at a negligibly low
level, when giving an appropriate iteration number, such as
30. Additionally, in order to reduce computation error, we
introduce Gaussian distribution into the weight parameter
initialization to accelerate the rate of our CNN’s conver-
gence, which avoids the rapid accumulation of computation
error during CNN training. Meanwhile, we also analyze the
effect of the batch size on the computation error. In Fig. 6(b),
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it can be observed that changing the batch size will hardly
influence the computation error at FP stage, where the num-
ber of iteration is 30. Relatively speaking, the computation
error at BP stage shows an upward tendency when the batch
size increases. However, the increase in the computation
error is relatively trivial. When the batch size is 100, the
corresponding computation error is only 7.28×10−14, which
is almost unable to affect the accuracy of anomaly detection.
It shows that SecureAD is valid and may achieve almost the
same accuracy as its plaintext counterpart with a negligible
computation error.
7 RELATED WORK
In the plaintext domain, anomaly event detection is viewed
as one of the most challenging issues due to the diversity
and complexity of anomaly types [22], [25], [26], [27], [28].
At present, the research on the video anomaly has attracted
extensive concerns, and many related techniques are devel-
oped successively [29], [30], [31]. As reviewed in [32], [33],
the early works for the video event detection are mainly
classified into two types, trajectory-based methods [25], [34]
and non-tracking methods [4], [5]. Following the success
of the deep learning techniques in various computer vision
tasks [35], the CNN-based anomaly detection has also raised
considerable attention recently [29], [36].
In the encrypted domain, privacy-preserving machine
learning technique dates back to [37], which trains the
classifier over encrypted individual data records. After that,
various types of secure machine learning approaches are
proposed. The encryption methods adopted by these ap-
proaches can be mostly divided into three types, namely,
differential privacy (DP), multi-party computation (MPC),
and HE. DP applies noise to conceal partially individual
data such that the statistic information on the dataset can be
calculated [38]. With DP, the final statistic accuracy is always
lower than that of the original plaintext data due to the
introduction of the noise. MPC is a cryptographic primitive
of securely jointing multiple parties to calculate the same
function, in which the input data of any party is not leaked
from each other. Using garbled circuits (GC) [39] to inves-
tigate MPC can achieve any function calculation [40], [41],
but high computation complexity incurs low efficiency and
poor reusability. Therefore, most of GC-based MPC is still
left in theoretical study, which is indicated in [42]. Recently,
the additive secret sharing based secure MPC has been
proposed to process some tasks related to a neural network,
such as feature extraction [15], and speech recognition [14].
However, the authors of [15] cannot provide a solution
to protect the privacy of the weight parameters. And the
scheme in [14] is limited to the full connected network. HE
is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, which is generally
used to encrypt data while allowing users to perform com-
putations on encrypted data before decrypting. At present, it
has been widely studied in neural networks for maintaining
the privacy of input data, model, returned results [8], [9],
[43], [44], [45], [46]. However, high computation costs and
encrypted data expansion limit HE to be practical.
To the best of our knowledge, the privacy-preserving
CNN-based framework for video anomaly detection has not
been proposed yet. Most relevant works mainly focus on
motion detection and tracking over encrypted surveillance
videos [16], [47], [48], [49]. The scheme in [50] can be used
to detect anomaly event, but its encryption algorithm is
not suitable for CNN. Moreover, the concept of anomaly
detection is also used to find network traffic [51], [52]
and malicious behavior [53]. In this paper, we develop a
novel framework SecureAD to offer a solution for detecting
event anomalies over encrypted videos. In SecureAD, the
content owners only outsource data shares to two ESs. When
obtaining these data, ESs can train the CNN model and offer
detection results, without compromising the privacy and
security concerns. And also, SecureAD can support attribute
based access control in multi-user scenarios.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a framework called SecureAD for privacy-
preserving video anomaly detection by combining the con-
volutional neural networks and secret sharing technique. A
series of secure novel calculation protocols were designed to
allow the edge servers to perform the CNN models training
and anomalous evaluations. In addition, we also developed
a new attribute-based access control mechanism by using
the Bloom filter technique. This mechanism could enable
servers to identify the legality of a query user, without
comprising the privacy of users’ attributes. Furthermore, the
theoretical analysis and practical simulations showed that
SecureAD could be effectively performed with a negligible
computation error.
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